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Abstract
The vast majority of today’s critical infrastructure is supported by numerous feedback control loops
and an attack on these control loops can have disastrous consequences. This is a major concern since
modern control systems are becoming large and decentralized and thus more vulnerable to attacks. This
paper is concerned with the estimation and control of linear systems when some of the sensors or
actuators are corrupted by an attacker.
In the first part we look at the estimation problem where we characterize the resilience of a system to
attacks and study the possibility of increasing its resilience by a change of parameters. We then propose
an efficient algorithm to estimate the state despite the attacks and we characterize its performance. Our
approach is inspired from the areas of error-correction over the reals and compressed sensing.
In the second part we consider the problem of designing output-feedback controllers that stabilize
the system despite attacks. We show that a principle of separation between estimation and control holds
and that the design of resilient output feedback controllers can be reduced to the design of resilient
state estimators.
I. INTRODUCTION
Today’s large-scale control systems are present everywhere in order to sustain the normal
operation of many of the critical processes that we rely on. Example of such systems include
chemical processes, the power grid, water distribution networks and many more.
In a typical control system one can identify different components including the actuators, the
sensors and the controllers. These different components need to communicate with each other:
for example the sensors communicate their measurements to the controllers, the controllers use
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2this information to compute the control input, and the control input is then sent to the actuators
so that it can be physically implemented. In order for this communication to take place, a
communication network is usually deployed across the plant to be controlled. Although wired
networks have been traditionally used for this purpose, an increasing number of control systems
now use wireless networks since they are easier to deploy and to maintain. In addition, these
networks are sometimes connected to the corporate intranet, and in some cases even to the
Internet. Consequently, modern control systems are becoming more open to the cyber-world,
and as such, are more vulnerable to attacks that can cause faults and failures in the physical
process even though launched in the cyber-domain. This realization led to the emergence of new
security challenges that are distinct from traditional cyber security as highlighted in [1], [2].
Real-world attacks on control systems have in fact occurred in the past decade and have
in some cases caused significant damage to the targeted physical processes. Perhaps one of
the most popular examples is the attack on Maroochy Shire Council’s sewage control system
in Queensland, Australia that happened in January 2000 [3], [4]. In this incident, an attacker
managed to hack into some controllers that activate and deactivate valves and, by doing so,
caused flooding of the grounds of a hotel, a park, and a river with a million liters of sewage [3].
Another well publicized example of an attack launched on physical systems is the very recent
StuxNet virus that targeted Siemens’ supervisory control and data acquisition systems which
are used in many industrial processes [5]. Other cases of attacks have been reported in the past
years, and we refer the reader to [3] for more real-world examples.
These examples indicate the clear need for strategies and mechanisms to identify and deal
with attacks on control systems.
Previous work related to security for control systems. The design of control and estimation
algorithms that are resilient against faults and failures is certainly not a new problem. In fault-
detection and identification [6], [7] the objective is to detect if one or more of the components
of a system has failed. Traditionally, this is done by comparing the measurements of the sensors
with an analytical model of the system and by forming the so-called residual signal (in some
cases, the residual signal actually corresponds to the output of some specifically designed LTI
system whose inputs are the sensor measurements [6]). This residual signal is then analyzed
(e.g., using signal processing techniques) in order to determine if a fault has occurred. In such
algorithms however, there is in general one residual signal per failure mode. As we will see later,
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3in our problem formulation the number of failure modes can be very large and one cannot afford
to generate and analyze a residual signal for each possible failure mode. In another area, namely
robust control [8], one seeks to design control methods that are robust against disturbances in
the model. In general however, these disturbances are treated as natural disturbances to the
system and are assumed to be bounded. This does not apply in the context of security since the
disturbances will typically be adversarial and therefore cannot be assumed bounded. This is the
case also in the area of stochastic control and estimation, where the disturbances are assumed
to follow a certain probabilistic model, which we cannot adopt for our problem.
Since these assumptions are not justifiable in the context of adversarial attacks, there has
been a recent increase in control systems security research [9], [10], [11], [12], [13], [14],
[15]. In [9], the authors consider the problem of control and estimation in a networked system
when the communication links are subject to disturbances. The disturbances (corresponding to
packet losses) are however assumed to follow a certain stochastic process (typically a Bernoulli
process) which does not necessarily capture the behavior of an attacker. In [10] the authors
consider a more intelligent jammer who plans his attacks in order to maximize a certain cost,
while the objective of the controller is to minimize this same cost. The authors showed the
existence of saddle-point equilibrium for this dynamic zero-sum game and derived the optimal
jamming strategy for a particular instance of the problem. The results are however derived in
the case of one-dimensional systems only, which is a main limitation of this work. In [11],
[12] the authors study the fundamental limitations of attack detection and identification methods
for linear systems, and for the particular case of power networks. They provide graph-theoretic
characterization of the vulnerability of such systems to attacks, and furthermore they propose
centralized and decentralized filters to detect and identify attacks when possible. These filters are
however computationally expensive and are in general difficult to implement. Another related
problem that received attention recently is the problem of reaching consensus in the presence of
malicious agents [14]. The authors characterize the number of infected nodes that can be tolerated
and propose a way to overcome the effect of the malicious agents when possible. However one
particularity of these works is that the dynamics is part of the algorithm and can be specifically
designed, rather than being given as in a physical system. Finally, there has also been recent
work in the area of real error-correction over adversarial channels, e.g., [16], where adversarial
noise could be unbounded. However the dynamics of the system does not generally play a role
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4and the correction capability is studied in a static setting that does not take advantage of the
dynamics of the system. Furthermore, in these works also, the error protection mechanism can
be designed by suitably choosing the coding matrix, whereas in our case, the plant dynamics is
given to us.
Contributions and organization of the paper. In this work we adopt a novel point of view
inspired from error-correction over the reals [16] which allows us to propose a new estimation
algorithm that is robust against the attacks and that is also computationally efficient, unlike most
of the previously proposed approaches. Furthermore, in contrast with some of the previously
described work, we do not restrict the type of attacks introduced by the attacker on the captured
nodes (in particular the attacks injected can be of arbitrary magnitude). In our framework, the
attacks are modeled as sparse vectors that affect the outputs (sensor attacks) as well as the inputs
(actuator attacks).
The contributions of this paper can be divided into two main parts:
1) The first part (section III) deals with the estimation problem in the presence of sensors
and actuator attacks. We first characterize the resilience of a system and the maximum
number of attacked nodes that can be tolerated for correct estimation. We then propose
a computationally feasible decoding algorithm to recover the state despite the attacks.
This algorithm is inspired from the area of compressed sensing and its relation to error-
correction over the reals [16]. Finally we show that if we can implement a state-feedback
law (i.e., change the dynamics matrix A to be A + BK), then one can always increase
the resilience of a system while still having freedom in choosing the performance (i.e.,
the eigenvalues) of the system. This first part of the paper mainly focuses on attacks on
sensors for ease of exposition, but we also show at the end of the section how the decoder
and some of the results can be extended to the case of attacks on actuators.
2) The second part of the work (section IV) deals with the problem of control with output
feedback in the presence of attacks on sensors. There we consider the question of designing
an output-feedback law that stabilizes the system despite attacks on sensors. Our main
result in this section is to show that if such a stabilizing law exists, then the state can
also be estimated despite the attacks on sensors. This means that the estimation and the
stabilization problems in the presence of sensor attacks are in some sense equivalent.
Hence, when designing an output-feedback stabilization law, one can instead focus on the
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5estimation problem, and use a state estimator resilient to attacks with any standard state-
feedback law to obtain a stabilizing output-feedback law resilient to attacks (separation of
estimation and control).
Preliminary versions of the results appeared in the conference papers [17], [18] as well as in
the Master’s thesis of the first author [19].
II. THE FORMAL SETTING AND NOTATIONS
The formal setting. Consider the linear control system given by the equations:
x(t+1) = Ax(t) +B(K(t)(y(0), . . . , y(t)) + w(t))
y(t) = Cx(t) + e(t)
(1)
Here x(t) ∈ Rn represents the state of the system at time t ∈ N, and y(t) ∈ Rp is the output
of the sensors at time t. The control input applied at time t depends on the past measurements
(y(τ))0≤τ≤t through the output feedback map K(t). The vector e(t) ∈ Rp represents the attacks
injected by the attacker in the different sensors, and the vector w(t) ∈ Rm represents the attacks
injected in the actuators. Note that if sensor i ∈ {1, . . . , p} is not attacked then necessarily
e
(t)
i = 0 and the output y
(t)
i of sensor i is not corrupted, otherwise e
(t)
i (and therefore y
(t)
i ) can
take any value. The sparsity pattern of the attack e(t) therefore indicates the set of attacked
sensors. The same observation holds for the attacks on actuators w(t).
Note that from a practical point of view, an attack on a sensor could either be interpreted as an
attack on the node itself (making it transmit an incorrect signal), or it could also be interpreted
as an attack on the communication link between the sensor and the receiver device. Similarly
an attack on an actuator could either be interpreted as an attack on the actuator itself, or on the
communication link from the controller to the actuator. Throughout the paper, we will be talking
about “attacked nodes” but we will keep in mind that the second interpretation (attack on the
communication link) is also possible. In section III-B we will actually look at a scenario where
it is the communication links that are compromised and not the nodes themselves.
We will assume in this paper that the set of attacked nodes does not change over time. More
precisely, if K ⊂ {1, . . . , p} is the set of attacked sensors and L ⊂ {1, . . . ,m} the set of attacked
actuators, then we have for all t, supp(e(t)) ⊂ K and supp(w(t)) ⊂ L (where supp(x) denotes
the support of x, i.e., the indices of the nonzero components of x). Note that this is a valid and
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6realistic assumption when the time it takes for the malicious agent to gain control of a node is
large compared to the time scale of the estimation algorithm. Furthermore observe that a model
where the set of attacked nodes is allowed to change at every time step while having a fixed
cardinality would in turn not be very realistic since it would assume that the attacker abandons
from t to t + 1 some of the nodes he had control over. For these reasons, we will assume for
our model that the sets K and L of attacked sensors and actuators is constant over time (and,
of course, unknown).
Moreover, since we are dealing with a malicious agent, we will not assume the attacks e(t)i or
w
(t)
j (for an attacked sensor i or actuator j) to follow any particular model and we will simply
take them to be arbitrary real numbers. The only assumption concerning the malicious agent will
be about the number of nodes that were attacked. Our statements will then typically characterize
the number of attacks that can be tolerated in order to correctly estimate/control the plant.
Notations. We use the following notations throughout the paper. If S is a set, we denote by |S|
the cardinality of S and by Sc the complement of S. For a vector x ∈ Rn, the support of x,
denoted by supp(x), is the set of nonzero components of x and the `0 norm of x is the number
of nonzero components of x:
supp(x) = {i ∈ {1, . . . , n} | xi 6= 0}, ‖x‖`0 = |supp(x)|.
Also, if K ⊂ {1, . . . , n}, we let PK be the projection map onto the components of K (PKx is
a vector with |K| components, e.g., if K = {3, 5} then PKx = (x3, x5)).
For a matrix M ∈ Rm×n we denote by Mi ∈ Rn the i’th row of M , for i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. We
define the row support of M to be the set of nonzero rows of M and we denote by ‖M‖`0 the
cardinality of the row support of M :
rowsupp(M) = {i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} |Mi 6= 0}, ‖M‖`0 = |rowsupp(M)|.
III. THE ESTIMATION PROBLEM
In this section we deal with the problem of estimating the state of a linear dynamical system
in the presence of attacks. Throughout the main part of this section we will assume that attacks
only occur on the sensors (i.e., no attacks on actuators) for ease of exposition. At the end of the
section though we show how to extend the results to the case where there are also attacks on
the actuators.
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7We consider in this section linear dynamical systems of the form:
x(t+1) = Ax(t)
y(t) = Cx(t) + e(t)
(2)
As mentioned before, e(t) ∈ Rp are the attack vectors injected by the malicious agent in the
sensors. For simplicity we have also discarded the control input BK(t)(y(0), . . . , y(t)) since it
does not affect the results in this section. Indeed the results presented here hold for any linear
affine system where the state evolves according to x(t+1) = Ax(t) + v(t) where v(t) is a known
input (for more details on this, see section IV-A).
The problem that we consider in this section is to reconstruct the initial state x(0) of the
plant from the corrupted observations (y(t))t=0,...,T−1. Note that since the matrix A is known, the
problem of reconstructing the current state x(t) or the initial state x(0) are –at least theoretically–
equivalent. Therefore, there is no loss of generality in focusing on the reconstruction of x(0)
instead of the current state x(T−1).
A. Error correction and number of correctable attacks
Let x(0) ∈ Rn be the initial state of the plant and let y(0), . . . , y(T−1) ∈ Rp be the first T
measurements that are transmitted from the sensors to the receiver device. The objective of the
receiver device is to reconstruct the initial state x(0) from these measurements. These vectors
are given by
y(t) = CAtx(0) + e(t),
where e(t) represent the error vector (i.e., the attack vector) injected by the attacker (throughout
the paper we will use the terms “error vector” and “attack vector” interchangeably to designate
the vector e(t) injected by the attacker; the term “error vector” emphasizes the error-correction
perspective we adopt in this paper). Recall that supp(e(t)) ⊂ K with K ⊂ {1, . . . , p} being the
set of sensors that are attacked and whose data is unreliable.
Having received the T vectors y(0), . . . , y(T−1), the receiver uses a decoder D : (Rp)T → Rn
in order to estimate the initial state x(0) of the plant. The decoder correctly estimates the initial
state if D(y(0), . . . , y(T−1)) = x(0).
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8We say that the decoder D corrects q errors if it correctly recovers the initial state x(0) for
any set K of attacked sensors of cardinality less than or equal to q. More formally we introduce
the following definition:
Definition 1. We say that q errors are correctable after T steps by the decoder D : (Rp)T →
Rn if for any x(0) ∈ Rn, and for any sequence of vectors e(0), . . . , e(T−1) in Rp such that
supp(e(t)) ⊂ K with |K| ≤ q, we have D(y(0), . . . , y(T−1)) = x(0) where y(t) = CAtx(0) + e(t),
t = 0, . . . , T − 1.
Furthermore, we say that q errors are correctable after T steps (or, equivalently, that the system
is resilient against q attacks after T steps) if there exists a decoder that can correct q errors after
T steps.
Let Eq,T denote the set of error vectors (e(0), . . . , e(T−1)) ∈ (Rp)T that satisfy ∀t ∈ {0, . . . , T−
1}, supp(e(t)) ⊂ K for some K ⊂ {1, . . . , p} with |K| ≤ q. Note that Eq,T is a union of
(
p
q
)
subspaces in (Rp)T .
1) Characterization of the number of correctable errors: Observe that, by definition 1, the
existence of a decoder that can correct q errors is equivalent to saying that the following map
Rn × Eq,T → (Rp)T
(x(0), e(0), . . . , e(T−1)) 7→ (y(0), . . . , y(T−1)) = (Cx(0) + e(0), . . . , CAT−1x(0) + e(T−1))
(3)
is invertible, or, more precisely, that it has an inverse for the first n components of its domain
(we are only interested in the state x(0), and not necessarily the error vectors). 1 Thus expressing
injectivity of this map is equivalent to saying that q errors are correctable. This gives the following
proposition:
Proposition 1. Let T ∈ N\{0}. The following are equivalent:
(i) There is no decoder that can correct q errors after T steps;
(ii) There exists xa, xb ∈ Rn with xa 6= xb, and error vectors (e(0)a , . . . , e(T−1)a ) ∈ Eq,T and
(e
(0)
b , . . . , e
(T−1)
b ) ∈ Eq,T such that Atxa + e(t)a = Atxb + e(t)b for all t ∈ {0, . . . , T − 1}.
The proposition above simply says that it is not possible to unambiguously recover the state
1These two conditions –the existence of an inverse and the existence of an inverse to recover just the first n components– are
actually equivalent since the attack vectors are uniquely determined by x(0) and the y(t)’s and are given by e(t) = y(t)−CAtx(0).
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9x(0) if there are two distinct values xa and xb with xa 6= xb that can, with less than q corrupted
sensors, explain the received data.
Note that the domain of the map defined in (3) is the Cartesian product of the whole Rn
with the error set Eq,T which is unbounded. This means that we require the decoder to recover
any initial state x(0) for any sequence of error vectors from Eq,T . In practice however one could
consider only vectors x(0) in some set Ω ⊂ Rn if one has prior knowledge on the initial state (for
example, if the states are all nonnegative, say for physical reasons, then one could take Ω = Rn+).
Similarly, if the attacker has a finite amount of energy then we could envisage considering only
elements of Eq,T in a certain ball of finite radius. We do not however pursue this here, and
we assume in particular that the initial state of the plant can be anywhere in Rn and that the
magnitude of the errors can be arbitrary.
We now give a necessary and sufficient condition for q errors to be correctable that is simpler
than the one in proposition 1.
Proposition 2. Let T ∈ N\{0}. The following are equivalent:
(i) There is a decoder that can correct q errors after T steps;
(ii) For all z ∈ Rn\{0}, |supp(Cz) ∪ supp(CAz) ∪ · · · ∪ supp(CAT−1z)| > 2q.
Proof: (i)⇒ (ii): Suppose for the sake of contradiction that there exists z ∈ Rn\{0} such
that |supp(Cz)∪supp(CAz)∪· · ·∪supp(CAT−1z)| ≤ 2q. Let La and Lb be two disjoint subsets
of {1, . . . , p} with |La| ≤ q and |Lb| ≤ q such that La ∪Lb = supp(Cz)∪ · · · ∪ supp(CAT−1z)
(such La and Lb exist since |supp(Cz) ∪ supp(CAz) ∪ · · · ∪ supp(CAT−1z)| ≤ 2q). Let
e
(t)
a = CAtz|La be the vector obtained from CAtz by setting all the components outside of La
to 0, and similarly let e(t)b = −CAtz|Lb . Then we have CAtz = e(t)a − e(t)b with supp(e(t)a ) ⊂ La
and supp(e(t)b ) ⊂ Lb with |La| ≤ q and |Lb| ≤ q. Now let, for t ∈ {0, . . . , T − 1}, y(t) =
CAtz+ e
(t)
b = CA
t · 0 + e(t)a . If q errors were correctable after T steps by some decoder D then
we would have D(y(0), . . . , y(T−1)) = z and also D(y(0), . . . , y(T−1)) = 0 which is impossible
since z 6= 0.
(ii)⇒ (i): We again resort to contradiction. Suppose that q errors are not correctable after
T steps: this means there exists xa 6= xb, and error vectors e(0)a , . . . , e(T−1)a (supported on La
with |La| ≤ q) and e(0)b , . . . , e(T−1)b (supported on Lb, with |Lb| ≤ q) such that CAtxa + e(t)a =
CAtxb + e
(t)
b for all t ∈ {0, . . . , T − 1}. Now let z = xa − xb 6= 0. If we let L = La ∪ Lb, then
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we have |L| ≤ 2q, and we have for all t ∈ {0, . . . , T − 1}, supp(CAtz) ⊂ L which shows that
(ii) does not hold.
It is interesting to note the connection of the proposition above with the definition of a q-
error-correcting linear code in the context of coding over the real numbers. A matrix C ∈ Rp×n
(with p > n) defines a q-error-correcting linear code if for any z 6= 0, |supp(Cz)| > 2q (see for
example [20, §3]). This is precisely the condition we obtain from the previous proposition when
T = 1 or when there is no dynamics.
It is also interesting to observe that the proposition above shows that one cannot recover the
initial state x(0) until the observability matrix given by
C
CA
...
CAT−1

has rank n. Indeed, if the observability matrix has rank smaller than n then it has a nontrivial
kernel and there exists z 6= 0 such that Cz = CAz = · · · = CAT−1z = 0. This shows,
by the above proposition, that “0 errors cannot be corrected”, or in other words, that one
cannot reconstruct x(0) even if there are no errors in the y(0), . . . , y(T−1). The condition stated
in proposition 2 can therefore be seen as a generalized condition for observability of a linear
dynamical system when the observations are corrupted (as per the model considered here).
Observe also that the characterization of proposition 2 shows that the maximum number of
correctable errors cannot increase beyond T = n measurements. Indeed, this is a direct conse-
quence of the Cayley-Hamilton theorem since we have for any z and for t ≥ n, supp(CAtz) ⊂
supp(Cz) ∪ supp(CAz) ∪ · · · ∪ supp(CAn−1z).
Finally, one can also directly see from the same proposition that the number of correctable
errors is always less than p/2, for any T . It turns out actually that generically (i.e., for “almost
all” systems (A,C)), the number of correctable errors is maximal and equal to dp/2− 1e.
Proposition 3. For almost all2 pairs (A,C) ∈ Rn×n × Rp×n the number of correctable errors
after T = n steps is maximal and equal to dp/2− 1e.
2That is, except on a set of Lebesgue measure zero
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Proof: We defer the proof of this proposition to section III-F where we prove a more general
result that takes into account attacks on actuators (cf. proposition 8).
2) Computing the number of correctable errors: Even though for almost all pairs (A,C) the
number of errors that can be corrected is maximal (equal to dp/2− 1e for T = n), the problem
of actually computing the number of errors that can be corrected for a given pair (A,C) after
a given number of steps T is a hard problem in general. Actually one simple yet expensive
algorithm is to look for the smallest |K| where K ⊂ {1, . . . , p} for which the following matrix
has a nontrivial kernel: 
PKcC
PKcCA
...
PKcCAT−1
 .
If s is the cardinality of the smallest K for which this matrix has nontrivial kernel, then by
proposition 2 the maximum number of correctable errors is ds/2−1e. This algorithm is however
computationally expensive and requires computing the rank of 2p matrices in the worst-case. A
recent result [21] shows that it is very unlikely that there is a more efficient way to perform the
computation 3.
B. Increasing the number of correctable errors by state feedback
In this section we consider the question of whether it is possible to make a given system (A,C)
more resilient against attacks by modifying the parameters of the system. More specifically, if
B is some given matrix, we look at the problem of designing a matrix K so that the pair
(A + BK,C) is resilient against a large number of attacks, while it satisfies at the same time
other design constraints.
From a practical point of view, this question can be motivated by the following scenario
depicted in Figure 1: we first assume that the physical system possesses a local control loop that
has direct access to the state of the plant and that can control the evolution of the physical system.
This is possible for example if the sensors are connected to the local controller through a wired
3In the special case T = 1 of error correction without dynamics, the number of errors that can be corrected is directly related
to the spark of a matrix F that annihilates C, i.e., such that FC = 0 (see [16, §I.G]). The spark of a matrix F is the smallest
number of columns that are linearly dependent. According to the recent paper [21], computing the spark of a matrix is NP-hard.
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Physical system
Local control loop
Sensors S1 S2 S3
Supervisory control
and monitoring
u=Kx
communication links
subject to attacks
(has direct access to state x)
x =Ax+Bu+
x =(A+BK)x+
Fig. 1. Scenario where a local control loop has direct access to uncorrupted sensor information. Using this local control loop,
the evolution of the physical system will be governed by the matrix A+BK where A is the open-loop matrix, B is the control
matrix, and K can be chosen arbitrarily. The objective is to find K such that the pair (A+BK,C) is resilient against a large
number of attacks. Choosing such a K will allow the higher level supervisory control and monitoring system to recover the
correct state despite attacks in the communication links between the sensors and the supervisory system.
link that is not subject to external attacks. If the local control loop implements a feedback law of
the form u = Kx then the evolution of the physical system is governed by the matrix A+BK.
Also, and as part of the overall plant, a high-level supervisory and monitoring system receives
measurements from the sensors through wireless and vulnerable communication links that are
subject to attacks. Observe that the choice K of the local controller will affect the resilience
of the system to attacks, i.e., how many errors are correctable by the supervisory system. The
objective here is therefore to design K in order to make the number of correctable errors of the
pair (A+BK,C) as large as possible.
Note that there are other design constraints that come into play in the choice of the local
feedback law. Typically K is chosen so that the eigenvalues of A+BK are inside the unit disc
so that the resulting closed-loop system is stable. It is known by the pole placement theorem
that this is possible if the pair (A,B) is controllable [22].
In this section we ask if one can also enforce the requirement that the number of correctable
errors of the new pair (A + BK,C) is large, without losing the freedom of choosing the
eigenvalues of A+BK. We show in this section that the answer is yes, and that if the pair (A,B)
is controllable, then it is possible to choose K such that dp/2 − 1e errors are correctable for
(A+BK,C) and such that the eigenvalues of A+BK are in any arbitrary (or almost arbitrary)
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prescribed locations in the complex plane. In other words, by an adequate choice of the local
control law, one can make the system more resilient to attacks (the number of correctable errors
dp/2− 1e is the maximum possible), without compromising the control performance.
More specifically, we have the following result4:
Proposition 4. Let A ∈ Rn×n, B ∈ Rn×1 and C ∈ Rp×n and assume that the pair (A,B)
is controllable. Then there exists a finite set F ⊂ C such that for any choice of n numbers
λ1, . . . , λn ∈ C\F such that the λi’s have distinct magnitudes, there exists K ∈ R1×n such that:
• the eigenvalues of the closed-loop matrix A+BK are λ1, . . . , λn.
• the number of correctable errors after n steps for the pair (A+BK,C) is maximal (equal
to dp/2− 1e).
In order to prove this result, we make use of the following lemma:
Lemma 1. Let A ∈ Rn×n and C ∈ Rp×n. Assume that A has n eigenvalues all with distinct
magnitudes (in particular A is diagonalizable). Then the following are equivalent:
(i) q errors are correctable for (A,C) after n steps.
(ii) for every eigenvector v of A, |supp(Cv)| > 2q.
Proof:
• (i) ⇒ (ii): This direction simply corresponds to taking x to be an eigenvector of A in the
condition |supp(Cx) ∪ · · · ∪ supp(CAn−1x)| > 2q of Proposition 2.
• (ii) ⇒ (i): We assume that all eigenvectors v of A satisfy |supp(Cv)| > 2q and we will
show that for any x 6= 0, we have |supp(Cx)∪ supp(CAx)∪ · · · ∪ supp(CAn−1x)| > 2q.
The idea here is that if x 6= 0 then for t large enough the vector Atx will be very close to
an eigenvector w of A, and hence the support of CAtx will have more than 2q elements
since |supp(Cw)| > 2q. More formally, let x ∈ Rn\{0} and consider the decomposition of
x in the eigenbasis of A: x =
∑s
i=1 αivi with αi 6= 0 for at least one i, and where v1, . . . , vs
are eigenvectors of A associated with eigenvalues λ1, . . . , λs. Since the eigenvalues of A
4We deal only with the single-input case here but the multi-input case can be handled using the same arguments. Moreover,
the condition for {λi} to have distinct amplitudes is not much of a restriction since one can always choose the λi’s to satisfy
this condition and the consequences in terms of performance are negligible.
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have distinct magnitudes we can assume that |λ1| > |λ2| > · · · > |λs|. We isolate the
largest eigenvalue in this decomposition and we denote λ = λ1 and w = v1. Now we
have (Atx − α1λtw)/λt → 0 when t → +∞. Let S = supp(Cw). Note that since w is
an eigenvector of A we have |S| > 2q (by assumption). We’ll now show that for t large
enough, the support of CAtx contains S: let β = mini∈S |(Cw)i| and observe that clearly
β > 0. Let t be large enough so that |C(A
tx−α1λtw)|i
|λ|t < β/2 for all i ∈ S. Now we have, for
i ∈ S:
1
|λ|t |CA
tx|i ≥ 1|λ|t (|λ
tCw|i − |CAtx− λtCw|i) > β − β/2 = β/2 > 0.
Hence S ⊂ supp(CAtx) for large enough t. But since we have supp(CAtx) ⊂ supp(Cx)∪
supp(CAx)∪· · ·∪supp(CAn−1x) by the Cayley-Hamilton theorem, we have S ⊂ supp(Cx)∪
supp(CAx) ∪ · · · ∪ supp(CAn−1x). Finally since this is true for any x 6= 0, and since
|S| > 2q, we conclude by 2 that q errors are correctable after n steps.
We now use this lemma to prove Proposition 4:
Proof: (Proof of Proposition 4)
To prove the result, we will show that if the chosen poles λ1, . . . , λn have distinct magnitudes
and do not fall in some finite set F , then there is a choice of K such that the eigenvalues
of A + BK are exactly the λ1, . . . , λn, and the corresponding eigenvectors vi are such that
|supp(Cvi)| = p. Thus, by the previous lemma, this will show that the number of correctable
errors for (A+BK,C) is dp/2− 1e.
First note that if λ is an eigenvalue of A + BK and x is a corresponding eigenvector, then
we have Ax + BKx = λx, or, if (λI − A)−1 is well defined, x = (λI − A)−1BKx, i.e., x is
proportional to the vector (λI −A)−1B (since Kx is a real number). This means that if λ is an
eigenvalue of A+BK, then necessarily the corresponding eigenvector is (λI − A)−1B.
We will therefore look for values of λ for which C(λI − A)−1B has full support.
Let i ∈ {1, . . . , p} be fixed and denote by ei the vector in Rp that has a 1 in the ith component
and zeros elsewhere. Note that since (A,B) is controllable there exists λ such that eTi C(λI −
A)−1B 6= 0 (see [22, Chapter 3, Theorem 2.17(ii)]), and in fact the set Fi = {λ ∈ C | eTi C(λI−
A)−1B = 0} ⊆ C is finite (zeros of a non-identically-zero rational fraction).
Now consider F = (∪ni=1Fi), and let λ1, . . . , λn be any choice of n numbers in C\F with
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distinct magnitudes. We will show that there exists K such that the eigenvalues of A+BK are
the λ′js and the eigenvectors vj are such that Cvj has full support.
By controllability of (A,B) there is a K such that the eigenvalues of A + BK are the λj’s.
We know that the eigenvectors of A + BK are the vj = (λjI − A)−1B. Now by the choice of
the λj’s and by the definition of F we know that for all j and for any i, eTi C(λjI−A)−1B 6= 0.
In other words, for any j, the vector Cvj has full support. Hence, by lemma 1, the number of
correctable errors of (A+BK,C) is maximal.
C. Optimization formulation of the optimal decoder
In the previous sections we have discussed and quantified the resilience of a given system
(A,C) by characterizing the maximum number of attacks that are tolerable so that the initial
state of the system could still be exactly recovered. We saw that if the system (A,C) satisfies
the condition
|supp(Cz) ∪ · · · ∪ supp(CAT−1z)| > 2q, ∀z 6= 0 (4)
then it is possible to correct any attacks on q sensors using the T observations y(0), . . . , y(T−1).
We did not discuss however how to actually recover the state x(0) from the observations. In this
section we focus on the problem of constructing a decoder that can correct any number q of
errors as long as q satisfies the condition (4) above.
Consider the decoder DT0 : (Rp)T → Rn defined such that DT0 (y(0), . . . , y(T−1)) is the optimal
xˆ solution of the following optimization problem:
minimize
xˆ∈Rn,Kˆ⊂{1,...,p}
|K|
subject to supp(y(t) − CAtxˆ) ⊂ Kˆ for t ∈ {0, . . . , T − 1}.
(5)
Observe that the decoder DT0 looks for the smallest set K of attacked sensors that can explain the
received data y(0), . . . , y(T−1). We show in the next proposition that the decoder DT0 is optimal
in terms of error-correction capabilities.
Proposition 5. Assume that q errors are correctable after T steps, i.e., that (4) holds. Then the
decoder DT0 corrects q errors, i.e., for any x
(0) ∈ Rn, and any e(0), . . . , e(T−1) in Rp such that
supp(e(t)) ⊂ K with |K| ≤ q, we have DT0 (y(0), . . . , y(T−1)) = x(0) where y(t) = CAtx(0) + e(t).
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Proof: Let x(0) and the e(t)’s satisfy the stated assumptions, with supp(e(t)) ⊂ K and
y(t) = CAt + e(t). Assume for the sake of contradiction that the feasible point (x(0), K) is
not the unique optimal point for (5). Hence there exists xa 6= x(0), and e(0)a , . . . , e(T−1)a with
supp(e(t)a ) ⊂ Ka that generate the same sequence y(0), . . . , y(T−1) of observed values, with in
addition, |Ka| ≤ |K| ≤ q. We therefore have two different initial conditions x(0) 6= xa and two
different error vectors corresponding to less than q attacked sensors that generate exactly the
same sequence of observed values. This exactly means that q errors are not correctable after T
steps which contradicts the assumption.
The proposition above therefore shows that the decoder DT0 is the best decoder in terms of
error-correction capabilities, since if any decoder can correct q errors, then DT0 can as well. One
issue however is that the optimization problem (5) is not practical since it is NP-hard in general.
Indeed for the special case T = 1 (corresponding to the case of “static” error-correction over
the reals mentioned earlier) the decoder becomes
minimize
x∈Rn
‖y − Cx‖`0 (6)
(where ‖z‖`0 = |supp(z)|) which is known to be NP-hard (see for example [20]).
However, in [16], Candes and Tao proposed to replace the `0 “norm” by an `1 norm, thereby
transforming the problem into a convex program that can be efficiently solved:
minimize
x∈Rn
‖y − Cx‖`1 .
It was then shown in [16] that if the matrix C satisfies certain conditions, then the solution of
this convex program is the same as the one given by the `0 optimal decoder. In the next section
we consider this transformation in the context of our problem.
D. The `1 decoder: a relaxation of the optimal decoder
For T ∈ N\{0}, consider the linear map Φ(T ) defined by:
Φ(T ) : Rn → Rp×T
x 7→
[
Cx | CAx | . . . | CAT−1x
]
.
Furthermore, if y(0), . . . , y(T−1) ∈ Rp, let Y (T ) the p × T matrix formed by concatenating the
y(t)’s in columns:
Y (T ) =
[
y(0) | y(1) | . . . | y(T−1)
]
∈ Rp×T .
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Recall that for a matrix M ∈ Rp×T with rows M1, . . . ,Mp ∈ RT the `0 “norm” of M is the
number of nonzero rows in M :
‖M‖`0 = |rowsupp(M)| = |{i ∈ {1, . . . , p} |Mi 6= 0}|.
Observe that the optimal decoder DT0 introduced in the previous section can be written as:
DT0 (y
(0), . . . , y(T−1)) = argmin
x∈Rn
‖Y (T ) − Φ(T )x‖`0 .
As we saw in the previous section, this decoder finds the minimum number of attacked sensors
that can explain the received data y(0), . . . , y(T−1).
Analogously to [16], we can define an `1 decoder which, instead of minimizing the number
of nonzero rows, minimizes the sum of the magnitudes of each row. Specifically, if we measure
the magnitude of a row by its `r norm in RT (for r ≥ 1), we obtain the following decoder DT1,r:
DT1,r(y
(0), . . . , y(T−1)) = argmin
x∈Rn
‖Y (T ) − Φ(T )x‖`1/`r (7)
where, by definition, ‖M‖`1/`r is the sum of the `r norms of the rows of the matrix M :
‖M‖`1/`r =
p∑
i=1
‖Mi‖`r .
Note that the optimization problem in (7) is convex and can be efficiently solved. Also note that
such “mixed” `1/`r norms were also used in the compressed sensing literature in the context of
joint-sparse and block-sparse signal recovery [23].
We saw in Proposition 2 that the number of errors that can be corrected by the optimal
`0 decoder DT0 is equal to the largest number q such that |supp(Cz) ∪ supp(CAz) ∪ · · · ∪
supp(CAT−1z)| > 2q for all z 6= 0.
The next proposition characterizes the maximum number of errors that can be corrected by
the `1/`r decoder DT1,r.
Proposition 6. The following are equivalent:
(i) The decoder DT1,r can correct q errors after T steps.
(ii) For all K ⊂ {1, . . . , p} with |K| = q and for all G = Φ(T )z with z ∈ Rn\{0} we have:∑
i∈K
‖Gi‖`r <
∑
i∈Kc
‖Gi‖`r . (8)
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Proof: (i) ⇒ (ii): Suppose for the sake of contradiction that (ii) does not hold. Then
there exists K ⊂ {1, . . . , p} with |K| = q, and G = Φ(T )z ∈ Rp×T with z 6= 0 such that∑
i∈K ‖Gi‖`r ≥
∑
i∈Kc ‖Gi‖`r . Let x0 = 0 and define the K-supported error vectors e(t), for
t ∈ {0, . . . , T − 1} by e(t)i = Gi,t if i ∈ K and e(t)i = 0 otherwise. Now consider y(t) =
CAtx0 + e(t) = e(t) and let Y (T ) be, as before, the p× T matrix obtained by concatenating the
y(t)’s in columns. Note that rowsupp(Y (T )) = K, and that Y (T )i = (Φ
(T )z)i for all i ∈ K. We
will now show that the objective function for (7) at z 6= 0 is smaller than at x0 = 0, which will
show that the decoder DT1,r fails to reconstruct x
(0) from the y(t)’s. This will show that (i) is not
true. Indeed we have:
‖Y (T ) − Φ(T )z‖`1/`r =
n∑
i=1
‖(Y (T ) − Φ(T )z)i‖`r =
∑
i∈Kc
‖Gi‖`r
≤
∑
i∈K
‖Gi‖`r =
n∑
i=1
‖(Y (T ) − Φ(T )x0)i‖`r = ‖Y (T ) − Φ(T )x0‖`1/`r .
(ii) ⇒ (i): We again resort to contradiction. Suppose that (i) is not true. This means there exists
x(0), and e(0), . . . , e(T−1) with supp(e(t)) ⊂ K with |K| ≤ q such that DT1,r(y(0), . . . , y(T−1)) 6=
x(0) where y(t) = CAtx(0) + e(t) (i.e., the decoder DT1,r fails to reconstruct x
(0) from the y(t)’s).
By definition of the decoder DT1,r, this means that there exists x˜ 6= x(0) that achieves a smaller
`1/`r objective than x(0):
n∑
i=1
‖(Y (T ) − Φ(T )x˜)i‖`r ≤
n∑
i=1
‖(Y (T ) − Φ(T )x(0))i‖`r .
Now let z = x˜ − x(0) 6= 0, and let G = Φ(T )z = U − V with U = Y (T ) − Φ(T )x(0) and
V = Y (T ) − Φ(T )x˜. We have∑
i∈K
‖Gi‖`r =
∑
i∈K
‖Ui − Vi‖`r ≥
∑
i∈K
‖Ui‖`r − ‖Vi‖`r
Now since rowsupp(U) ⊂ K, and since x˜ achieves a smaller `1/`r objective than x0, we have∑
i∈K ‖Ui‖`r =
∑n
i=1 ‖Ui‖`r ≥
∑n
i=1 ‖Vi‖`r . Hence we have∑
i∈K
‖Gi‖`r ≥
n∑
i=1
‖Vi‖`r −
∑
i∈K
‖Vi‖`r =
∑
i∈Kc
‖Vi‖`r =
∑
i∈Kc
‖Gi‖`r
where the last equality is because rowsupp(U) ⊂ K. Hence (ii) is not true.
Observe that, as expected, if the `1/`r decoder can correct q errors, then the `0 decoder can
correct q errors as well. Indeed, if we assume the opposite, then by Proposition 2 there exists
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z 6= 0 such that |supp(Cz) ∪ · · · ∪ supp(CAT−1z)| ≤ 2q, which is equivalent to saying that
|rowsupp(Φ(T )z)| ≤ 2q. Now let G = Φ(T )z and let K be the q rows of G with the largest `r
norms, then we clearly have
∑
i∈K ‖Gi‖`r ≥
∑
i∈Kc ‖Gi‖`r , which contradicts the condition of
the previous proposition.
As a matter of fact, the condition of the previous proposition (for the `1/`r decoder) is in
some sense a more quantitative version of the condition of proposition 2 for the `0 decoder. The
two conditions guarantee that the row components of Φ(T )z are sufficiently spread and are not
too concentrated on a small subset of the rows.
As an illustration, consider the simple example where the number of sensors is p = n and
C = In (i.e., we have one sensor per component of the state x ∈ Rn) and where A is the cyclic
permutation given by:
A =

0 1 . . . 0 0
...
... . . . 0
0 0 . . . 0 1
1 0 0 . . . 0
 (9)
It is easy to see that after T = n, the rows of the matrix Φ(n)z =
[
z Az . . . An−1z
]
are identical up to a permutation, and so the `r norm of any two rows of Φ(T )z are equal.
This shows that for any subset K of rows with |K| < n/2, we have ∑i∈K ‖(Φ(n)z)i‖`r <∑
i∈Kc ‖(Φ(n)z)i‖`r , which shows that the `1/`r decoder can correct a maximal number of errors
after n steps, namely, dn/2− 1e.
Finally note that the condition of Proposition 6 for the `1/`r decoder corresponds to the
well-known “nullspace property” in compressed sensing and sparse signal recovery [24].
E. Numerical simulations
In this section we show the performance of the proposed decoding algorithm first on a random
toy example and then on a more realistic system modeling an electric power network.
1) Random system: We first consider the `1/`2 decoder on a system of size n = 25, p = 20
where A ∈ R25×25 and C ∈ R20×25 have iid Gaussian entries. For different values q of attacked
sensors, we tested the decoder on 200 different initial conditions x(0) and attacked sensors
K ⊂ {1, . . . , p} with |K| = q. The initial conditions x(0) were randomly generated from the
standard Gaussian distribution, and the attack sets were chosen uniformly at random from the
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set of subsets of {1, . . . , p} of size q. Figure 2a shows the fraction of initial conditions that were
correctly recovered by the `1/`2 decoder (cf. equation (7)) in less than T = 15 time steps for
the different values of q. We see that for q less than 6 all the initial conditions were correctly
recovered in less than T = 15 time steps. Figure 2b shows the number of time steps that it
took in average to correctly recover the initial state, as a function of the number of corrupted
components q. We see that as q increases, more measurements were needed to correctly recover
the state of the system.
For each simulation, the attack values (i.e., the values injected by the attacker in the compo-
nents K) were chosen randomly from a Gaussian distribution. In order to illustrate the fact that
the decoder can handle unbounded attacks, the magnitude of the attacks were chosen to be 20
times larger than the magnitude of the state. Furthermore, the matrix A was appropriately scaled
so it has a spectral radius of 1. The optimization problems were solved using CVX [25].
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Fig. 2. Performance of `1/`2 decoder on a randomly chosen system with n = 25 states and p = 20 sensors. We see that when
the number of attacked sensors is small enough, the `1/`2 can still recover the exact state of the system (left). As the number
of attacked sensors increases, more measurements are needed to correctly recover the state of the system (right).
2) Electric power network: In this section we apply the proposed decoding algorithm on a
model of an electric power network and more specifically on the IEEE 14-bus power network
[26]. The network, depicted in Figure 3a is composed of 5 synchronous generators and a total
of 14 buses. The system is represented by 2× 5 = 10 states giving the rotor angles δi and the
frequencies ωi = dδi/dt of each generator. Under some simplifying assumptions the evolution of
the system can be captured by a linear difference equation corresponding to the linearized swing
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equations (see [27] for the derivation of the equations). We assume, like in [28], that p = 35
sensors are deployed and measure at every time step the real power injections at every bus (14
sensors), the real power flows along every branch (20 sensors), and the rotor angle at generator
1 (1 sensor).
For different values of attacked sensors q, we ran 200 simulations with different sets of attacked
sensors K of cardinality q, and different initial conditions x(0) that were randomly generated
like in the previous example. In the simulations we did not allow the last sensor measuring the
rotor angle to be attacked. Indeed if this sensor is attacked then there is no hope of correctly
recovering the state since the system becomes unobservable. The `1 decoder we used however
is the one described in Section III-D and did not incorporate the knowledge of the unattacked
sensor in any way. Figure 3b shows the number of simulations (out of the 200) where the state
x(0) was correctly recovered using the `1/`∞ decoder in less than T = 10 steps. Observe that
for q ≤ 4 the success rate of the decoder was 100%. Furthermore when q ≤ 12 the decoder
correctly recovers the state in more than 90% of the cases. These simulations show that the `1/`r
decoder works very well in this example and therefore is a promising practical technique.
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Fig. 3. Performance of the `1/`∞ decoder on the IEEE 14-bus power network example. The decoder successfully recovered
the state of the system when the number of attacked sensors was less than 4. When the number of attacked sensors was less
than 12, the decoder recovered the correct state in more than 90% of the cases.
F. The case of attacks on actuators
In this section we incorporate into our model attacks on actuators (in addition to attacks on
sensors) and we study the resilience of linear control systems to such attacks. Consider a plant
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that evolves according to the equations:
x(t+1) = Ax(t) +B(K(t)(y(0), . . . , y(t)) + w(t))
y(t) = Cx(t) + e(t)
(10)
where A ∈ Rn×n, B ∈ Rn×m, C ∈ Rp×n and (K(t))t=0,1,... is an output-feedback control law.
As before the vectors e(t) represent attacks on sensors. The vectors w(t) represent attacks on
actuators: if actuator j ∈ {1, . . . ,m} is not attacked, then w(t)j = 0, otherwise actuator j is
attacked and w(t)j can be arbitrary. The set of attacked actuators will typically be denoted by L.
In this section we will use the letter q to denote the total number of attacked nodes (sensors and
actuators), q = |K|+ |L|.
Our objective is to monitor the state of the plant from the observations y(t). More formally if T
is some time horizon, we wish to reconstruct the sequence5 of states x(0), . . . , x(T−1) from the ob-
servations y(0), . . . , y(T−1). Observe that reconstructing the sequence x(0), . . . , x(T−1) is equivalent
to reconstructing the initial condition x(0) and the vectors Bw(0), . . . , Bw(T−2). Now this recon-
struction is possible if, and only if, the map that sends the tuple (x(0), Bw(0), . . . , Bw(T−2), e(0), . . . , e(T−1))
to the corresponding outputs (y(0), . . . , y(T−1)) is injective. Using the notation
OT =

C
CA
...
CAT−1
 ∈ RpT×n, MT =

0 . . . . . . 0
C 0 . . . 0
CA C . . . 0
...
... . . .
...
CAT−2 CAT−3 . . . C

∈ RpT×n(T−1)
this map is given by:
(x(0), Bw(0), . . . , Bw(T−2), e(0), . . . , e(T−1)) 7→ OTx(0) +MT

Bw(0)
...
Bw(T−2)
+

e(0)
...
e(T−1)

5Observe that in the previous section where we dealt with attacks on sensors only, the objective was to only reconstruct the
initial state x(0) since we could then simply use the dynamics to propagate the initial condition and obtain x(1), x(2), . . . , x(T−1).
When considering attacks on actuators, using the dynamics to propagate the initial state requires the knowledge of the attacks.
Hence in this section we explicitly ask for the recovery of the whole sequence x(0), . . . , x(T−1). Note also that one could
introduce a delay parameter d ∈ N and ask for the recovery of the states up to time T − 1− d only. The results in this section
can easily be extended to this case, however for ease of exposition we consider only the problem of recovering the whole
sequence of states up to the current time T − 1.
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If this map is injective when the w(t)’s and e(t)’s are restricted to have less than q nonzero
components combined (i.e., |K|+ |L| ≤ q), we say that q attacks are correctable, or equivalently,
that the system is resilient against q attacks. More formally we have the following definition:
Definition 2. Let a control system of the form (10) be given. We say that q attacks are correctable
after T steps (or equivalently, that the system is resilient against q attacks after T steps) if there
exists a decoder D : (Rp)T → (Rn)T such that for any x(0) ∈ Rn, for any w(0), . . . , w(T−2) with
supp(w(t)) ⊆ L and any e(0), . . . , e(T−1) with supp(e(t)) ⊆ K with |K| + |L| ≤ q we have
D(y(0), . . . , y(T−1)) = (x(0), Bw(0), . . . , Bw(T−2)).
The previous discussion leads to the following proposition which gives a characterization of
the resilience of a linear control system to attacks on sensors and actuators:
Proposition 7. Let a control system of the form (10) be given. The following are equivalent:
(i) The system is not resilient against q attacks after T steps
(ii) There exists x 6= 0, and vectors w(0), . . . , w(T−2) and e(0), . . . , e(T−1) with |supp(w(0))∪· · ·∪
supp(w(T−2))|+ |supp(e(0)) ∪ · · · ∪ supp(e(T−1))| ≤ 2q such that
OTx(0) +MT

Bw(0)
...
Bw(T−2)
+

e(0)
...
e(T−1)
 = 0 ∈ RpT
Observe that if a system is resilient against q attacks then necessarily q < p/2. Indeed if q
attacks (i.e., sensor and actuator attacks) are correctable, then necessarily q sensor attacks are
also correctable which implies that q < p/2 using the earlier results of section III-A. We now
show that for most systems the number of correctable errors is maximal and equal to dp/2− 1e.
Proposition 8. For almost any6 triple (A,B,C), the number of correctable errors (sensor and
actuator errors) after T = n steps is maximal and equal to dp/2− 1e.
Proof: Using the notations above for OT and MT , consider the matrix
ST =
[
OT MT IpT
]
(11)
6That is, except on a set of Lebesgue measure zero
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where IpT is the pT × pT identity matrix. Note that ST is a pT × (n+m(T − 1) + pT ) matrix
and its coefficients are all polynomial in the coefficients of A,B,C.
Let K ⊆ {1, . . . , p} and L ⊆ {1, . . . ,m} with |K| + |L| = q and consider the following
submatrix of ST
SK,LT =
[
OT MLT IKpT
]
(12)
obtained by keeping the columns indexed by L in each of the T − 1 column blocks of MT and
those indexed by K in each of the T column blocks of IpT . Therefore S
K,L
T has pT rows and
n+ |L|(T −1)+ |K|T columns. For a given triple (A,B,C), saying that q errors are correctable
is equivalent to saying that for any attack pattern (K,L) such that |K|+ |L| ≤ 2q the map SK,LT
is injective (cf. point (ii) in proposition 7).
We will now show that if |K|+ |L| < p, then for almost any triple (A,B,C) the matrix SK,LT
is injective. Indeed note first that if q < p, then SK,LT has more rows than columns if the horizon
T is large enough and greater than n:
ncols(SK,LT ) = n+ |L|(T − 1) + |K|T = n− |L|+ qT
≤ n− |L|+ (p− 1)T = pT + (n− |L| − T ) ≤ pT = nrows(SK,LT )
where ncols denotes the number of columns and nrows denotes the number of rows. Hence SK,LT
is a polynomial matrix in A,B,C that has more rows than columns and thus for almost any
choice of (A,B,C), it is injective. 7 In other words, we showed that the set of (A,B,C) for
which SK,LT is not injective has Lebesgue measure 0.
Therefore, since there are only finitely many attack sets K and L, the set of triplets (A,B,C)
for which there exists K ⊂ {1, . . . , p} and L ⊂ {1, . . . ,m} with |K|+ |L| < p such that SK,LT is
not injective has Lebesgue measure zero. Hence this means that for almost any triple (A,B,C)
the number of correctable errors is maximal (and equal to dp/2− 1e) when T ≥ n.
7Indeed observe first that there exists a particular choice of A,B,C such that SK,LT is injective: take for example A to be the
circular permutation matrix [see equation (9)], B = 0, and C to be the projection on the first p components. Consider now the
determinants of the submatrices of SK,LT which are polynomials in the coefficients of A,B,C. Each one of these polynomials
is not identically zero –because there exists a particular choice of A,B,C such that SK,LT is injective– and so the zero set of
each of these polynomials has Lebesgue measure zero, thus the union of these zero sets has Lebesgue measure zero, and so this
means that for almost any choice of A,B,C the matrix SK,LT is injective.
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a) An explicit decoder: We now consider the problem of designing a decoding algorithm
that recovers the sequence of states despite attacks on sensors and actuators. We show that one
can formulate the decoding problem as an optimization problem, in the same way we did when
there were only sensor attacks. Indeed assume we have received measurements y(0), . . . , y(T−1)
and that we wish to reconstruct the sequence of states x(0), . . . , x(T−1). Then this can be done
by solving the following optimization problem:
minimize |Kˆ|+ |Lˆ|
subject to supp(eˆ(t)) ⊆ Kˆ, supp(wˆ(t)) ⊆ Lˆ
y(t) = Cxˆ(t) + eˆ(t)
xˆ(t+1) = Axˆ(t) +B(u(t) + wˆ(t))
(13)
The optimization variables are indicated by a “hat” (e.g., xˆ(t), etc.); the other variables (namely,
y(t) and u(t)) are given. The optimization program above finds the simplest possible explanation
of the received data y(0), . . . , y(T−1), i.e., the one with the smallest number of attacked nodes.
One can easily show that if the system is resilient against q attacks (in the sense of definition 2),
and if the number of actual attacks is less than q, then the output of the optimization problem
above gives the correct sequence of states, i.e., xˆ(0) = x(0), . . . , xˆ(T−1) = x(T−1).
Unfortunately though, and as we mentioned earlier, solving this optimization problem is hard
in general. We can however use the same ideas used previously to relax the decoder by replacing
the “`0” norm (that measures the cardinality of the attack set) by an `1 norm. When considering
attacks on actuators in addition to attacks on sensors this relaxation leads to the following
tractable decoder:
minimize
∑p
i=1 ‖Eˆi‖`r + λ
∑m
i=1 ‖Wˆi‖`r
subject to Eˆi = (eˆ
(0)
i , . . . , eˆ
(T−1)
i )
Wˆi = (wˆ
(0)
i , . . . , wˆ
(T−2)
i )
y(t) = Cxˆ(t) + eˆ(t)
xˆ(t+1) = Axˆ(t) +B(u(t) + wˆ(t))
(14)
For each i the auxiliary variables Eˆi ∈ RT and Wˆi ∈ RT carry the i’th components of the attack
vectors over the time horizon t = 0, . . . , T − 1. Thus if ‖Eˆi‖`r = 0 then eˆ(t)i = 0 for all t =
0, . . . , T−1 and the i’th sensor is not attacked, and similarly if ‖Wˆi‖`r = 0 then the i’th actuator is
not attacked. Now observe that the objective function
∑p
i=1 ‖Eˆi‖`r+λ
∑m
i=1 ‖Wˆi‖`r is nothing but
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a weighted sum of the `1 norms of the vectors (‖Eˆi‖`r)i=1,...,p ∈ Rp and (‖Wˆi‖`r)i=1,...,m ∈ Rm.
Note that we have introduced a tuning parameter λ to control the relative weight between the term
corresponding to the attacks on sensors and the term corresponding to the attacks on actuators.
b) Numerical simulations: To illustrate the behavior of the `1 decoder, we tested it on a
synthetic randomly-generated system with n = 15 states, m = 10 actuators and p = 10 sensors8.
Figure 4a shows the performance of the decoder as a function of the number of attacked sensors
and actuators. We see that on this example the `1 decoder correctly recovers the state of the
system despite the attacks when the number of attacked sensors and actuators is small enough.
Note that the decoder as given in equation (14) depends on the choice of the parameter λ.
For the simulations of figure 4a we used the value λ = 10 which we empirically found to be a
suitable value for the system we considered. It would be interesting however to see if there is a
simple and systematic way to directly find the best value of λ from the data and the parameters
of the system.
We also tested the decoder (14) on the power network example of section III-E2. Recall that
the IEEE 14-bus network we considered is comprised of 5 generators and 14 buses, and is
modeled by a linear dynamical system with 2 × 5 = 10 states (rotor angle δi and frequency
ωi = dδi/dt for each generator i) and 35 sensors. An attack on an actuator here corresponds to
an attack on the mechanical power input to a generator i and is modeled by an additive input
wi affecting the equation governing the frequency ωi of generator i [27].
For different values of |L| (number of attacked generators), and |K| (number of attacked
sensors), we ran the `1/`∞ decoder of equation (14) and we recorded its success rate9 over 200
simulations with different initial conditions and attack sets that were randomly generated like
in the previous examples of section III-E2. The results of the simulations are shown in figure
4b. We see that when the number of attacked sensors is small enough, the decoder correctly
recovers the state of the system. We also remark that, unlike the previous example of figure 4a,
the performance of the decoder is not really affected by the number of attacked generators. This
8The system was generated in the same way as the example of section III-E: the entries of A, B, C are iid standard Gaussian,
and A was normalized so it has spectral radius 1.
9We declare the decoder to be successful after T steps if it correctly recovers the whole sequence of states up to time T − 1
(i.e., with a delay of d = 1). Indeed, due to the very special structure of the C matrix of the system (the sensors only measure
the rotor angles and not the frequencies), it is impossible to reconstruct the state perfectly without delay.
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Fig. 4. (Left) Performance of the `1/`2 decoder (14) (with constant λ = 10) on a randomly generated system with n = 15
states, m = 10 actuators and p = 10 sensors. Dark color indicates a high success rate and white color indicates a low success
rate. We observe that when the number of attacked sensors and actuators is small enough the decoder correctly recovers the
state of the system. Also we remark that the resilience with respect to attacked sensors decreases as the number of attacked
actuators increases, and vice-versa.
(Right) Performance of the `1/`∞ decoder (14) (with λ = 10−3) on the IEEE 14-bus power network example of section III-E2.
We observe that when the number of attacked sensors is small enough, the decoder correctly recovers the state of the system,
independently of the number of attacked generators. This suggests in particular that the system is highly resilient against attacks
on generators.
suggests that the system is highly resilient against attacks on the generators since despite these
attacks the state of the system can still be correctly recovered from the measurements (when the
number of attacked sensors is small).
IV. THE CONTROL PROBLEM WITH OUTPUT-FEEDBACK
In this section we consider general linear control systems with output feedback of the form:
x(t+1) = Ax(t) +BK(t)(y(0), . . . , y(t))
y(t) = Cx(t) + e(t)
(15)
One of the main questions that we address in this section is to determine whether for a given
system (A,B,C), there exists a control law (i.e., a family (K(t))t=0,1,...) that drives the state of
the system (15) to the origin even if some of the sensors are attacked. Observe that the sensor
attacks can affect the control inputs (since the control inputs are function of the y(t)’s) which
can in turn deviate the state x(t) from its nominal path.
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Note that if there were attacks on the actuators then such a stabilizing control law does not
exist in general, and that is why we focus only on sensor attacks in this section.
It is clear that if q sensor errors are correctable (in the sense defined in the previous section,
i.e., that it is possible to recover the state despite any attacks on q sensors), then one can
stabilize the system in the presence of attacks: indeed, one can simply decode the state (since q
errors are correctable), and then apply a standard state feedback law of the form u = Kx (for
example). The main contribution of this section is to show that the converse of this statement is
essentially true. More specifically, we show in Theorem 1 that if (K(t))t=0,1,... is any feedback
law that stabilizes the system (with a fast enough decay) despite attacks on any q sensors, then
necessarily q errors are correctable. This theorem shows that one can essentially decouple the
problem of estimation and of control in the scenario we consider: in other words, there is no
loss of resilience in searching for an output feedback law that is the composition of a decoder
with a standard state feedback.
A. Some properties
We start by defining the notion of correctability of q errors for systems with output-feedback
control inputs. We will see in particular that it is independent of the feedback law used. Recall
that the symbol Eq,T denotes the set of attack sequences of length T on any q sensors:
Eq,T =
{
(e(0), . . . , e(T−1)) ∈ (Rp)T |
∃K ⊂ {1, . . . , p} , |K| = q ∀t ∈ {0, . . . , T − 1}, supp(e(t)) ⊂ K
}
.
We also use the notation y(t, x(0), e) to denote the output at time t of the control system (15)
when the initial state is x(0) and for the attack sequence e ∈ Eq,T . We now give the definition
of correctability of q errors for systems with output-feedback control inputs:
Definition 3. Let a control system of the form (15) be given. We say that q errors are correctable
after T steps if there exists a function D : (Rp)T → Rn such that for any x(0) ∈ Rn and any
attack sequence e ∈ Eq,T , we have D
(
y(0, x(0), e), . . . , y(T − 1, x(0), e)
)
= x(0).
It is not hard to see that, since the systems we consider are linear and since the control inputs
only depend on the measurements, the property of correctability of q errors just defined above
does not depend on the control law nor on B, and in fact only depends on A and C. Indeed, saying
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that q errors are not correctable (after T steps) for the controlled system (A,B,C, (K(t))t=0,1,...)
means that there exists xa 6= xb, and error vectors ea, eb ∈ Eq,T such that y(t, xa, ea) = y(t, xb, eb)
for all t = 0, . . . , T − 1. In other words, we have, for all t ∈ {0, . . . , T − 1}:
CAtxa+C[B,AB, . . . , A
t−1B]

u
(t−1)
a
...
u
(0)
a
+e(t)a = CAtxb+C[B,AB, . . . , At−1B]

u
(t−1)
b
...
u
(0)
b
+e(t)b
(16)
where u(τ)a = U (τ)(y(0, xa, ea), . . . , y(τ, xa, ea)) and u
(τ)
b = U
(τ)(y(0, xb, eb), . . . , y(τ, xb, eb)) for
τ = 0, . . . , t− 1. Now observe that the terms on the left-hand side and right-hand side of (16)
with the control inputs are equal (since y(s, xa, ea) = y(s, xb, eb) for all s and thus u
(τ)
a = u
(τ)
b ).
Hence the equality (16) is equivalent to saying that for all t ∈ {0, . . . , T − 1}, we have:
CAtxa + e
(t)
a = CA
txb + e
(t)
b .
And this exactly means that q errors are not correctable for (A,C). This therefore shows that
the notion of correctability does not depend on the control law used.
In other words, one can use the conditions developed earlier for correctability of q errors for
linear systems with no inputs and apply them to systems with output-feedback control inputs.
For example we have that q errors are correctable for the control system (15) if, and only if,
|supp(Cz) ∪ · · · ∪ supp(CAT−1z)| > 2q for all z 6= 0.
B. Main result: separation of estimation and control
We are now ready to state our result on separation of estimation and control.
Theorem 1. Let A,B,C be three matrices of appropriate sizes and assume that a control strategy
given by the (K(t))t=0,1,... is such that: for any x(0) ∈ Rn and for any sequence of error vectors
e ∈ Eq,T , the sequence (x(t)) defined by:
x(t+1) = Ax(t) +BK(t)(y(0), . . . , y(t))
y(t) = Cx(t) + e(t)
(17)
satisfies
‖x(t)‖ ≤ καt‖x(0)‖
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where κ > 0 and where 0 ≤ α < 1 is small enough: α < min{|λ| | λ eigenvalue of A}. Then
necessarily q errors are correctable after n steps.
Proof: We proceed by contradiction. Assume that q errors are not correctable after n steps.
Then this means there exists a nonzero initial state x¯ 6= 0 that is indistinguishable from the initial
state 0. In other words, there exist ea, eb ∈ Eq,T such that the outputs of the control system (17)
in the two different executions:
1) x(0) = x¯ and e(t) = e(t)a ; and
2) x(0) = 0 and e(t) = e(t)b .
are equal for all t = 0, . . . , n − 1. But by the Cayley-Hamilton theorem, it is not hard to see
that the sequences ea and eb can be extended to t ≥ n so that the outputs of the system (17) are
equal for all t ≥ 0. Observe now that since the control law K(t) only depends on the outputs,
this means that in these two executions, the same sequence of inputs, u(t), will be used.
Furthermore, since we must have in both cases, ‖x(t)‖ ≤ κe−αt‖x(0)‖, this leads, for the case
where x(0) = 0, that x(t) = 0 for all t ≥ 0, and so necessarily, Bu(t) = x(t+1) − Ax(t) = 0 for
all t ≥ 0. Hence for the first case (when x(0) = x¯), the recurrence relation is x(t+1) = Ax(t),
which gives x(t) = Atx¯. We now get a contradiction since x(t) should decay at rate of α, but
the eigenvalues of A are all strictly larger than α. This completes the proof.
Remark. Note that the assumption on the decay rate to be fast enough is necessary; otherwise the
result is not true. Indeed, if for example A is already a stable matrix, one cannot deduce anything
from the mere existence of a stabilizing control law (since the system is by itself stable!). For
a concrete example, take A = 0.5I , B = I , C = I (note that A is stable). We know from the
characterization of the number of correctable errors that even 1 error is not correctable after any
number of steps (for example if we take x = (1, 0, . . . , 0), then |supp(Cx)∪supp(CAx)∪. . . | =
1 6> 2q if q > 0). Now if we consider the trivial output feedback law K(t) = 0 for all t, the
resulting system is of course stable despite any number of attacks (the state evolution is simply
x(t+1) = 0.5x(t) and does not even depend on the sensor outputs), but as we just saw one cannot
even construct a decoder to correct even 1 error!
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V. CONCLUSION
In this paper we considered the problems of estimation and control of linear systems when
some of the sensors or actuators are attacked. For the estimation problem we gave a charac-
terization of the number of attacks that can be tolerated so that the state of the system can
still be exactly recovered, and we showed how one can increase the resilience of the system
by state-feedback while guaranteeing a certain performance. We then showed that there is an
explicit (though computationally hard) decoder that can correct the maximal number of errors.
The decoder was then relaxed to obtain a computationally feasible decoding algorithm which
appears to perform well in the numerical simulations.
We then considered the problem of designing an output feedback law to stabilize a linear plant
where at most q sensors are attacked. Our main result was to show that if such a resilient output-
feedback law exists, then necessarily there also exists a decoder that is resilient against q attacks.
This shows in particular that there is no loss of resilience in searching for an output-feedback
law that is the composition of a decoder with a standard state feedback law.
There are many important open questions, which are unanswered in this work. For example,
the question of constructing an iterative estimator (where the estimate of the state is updated
by a simple iterative rule each time a new measurement is received), instead of the one-shot `1
estimator in this paper, would be interesting in particular from a computational point of view.
Another subject of interest is to study the effect of exogenous noise on the performance of the
estimator presented in this paper. Finally, ideas on how to specialize the techniques proposed
here to particular applications, by taking into account structural vulnerabilities (in terms of sets
of sensors and actuators attacked) might be of interest.
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